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THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS, 
CIVIL PEACE AND THE QUEST FOR 
TRUTH 
Murray Dry* 
I. INTRODUCfiON 
Judicial review makes American constitutional law as intel-
lectually engaging a subject of study as it is an important part of . 
American government. By combining particular facts and legal 
controversies with appeals to principles of justice, American 
constitutional law is the country's practical political philosophy. 
It covers what Francis Bacon called "knowledges that are 
drenched in flesh and blood, ... about the which men's affec-
tions, praises, [and] fortunes do turn and are conversant." 1 The 
first amendment freedoms of speech and religion are particularly 
interesting and important because of their connection to the lib-
eral principle of toleration, and through that principle to phi-
losophy, or the quest for truth. The connection is the philo-
sophic argument made in defense of laws which encouraged 
toleration; the argument claimed that truth as well as freedom 
benefitted from toleration. First made by John Milton and then 
extended by John Locke and Benedict de Spinoza, this argument 
succeeded in establishing civil peace and political freedom in 
England in the seventeenth century and in America and France 
in the eighteenth century. 
The American founders, who drew on Locke and Charles 
de Montesquieu, believed that constitutional government was 
informed by philosophic truth. Do we still believe that? There 
* Charles A. Dana Professor of Political Science, Middlebury College. This arti-
cle is a revised version of a talk the author gave at the University of Oregon's Humanities 
Center on April 30, 1997. The author wishes to thank his research assistant, Damjam 
deKrnjevic Miskovic, for his careful reading and thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. 
1. Francis Bacon said that about "civil history, morality (and] policy," in contrast 
to natural philosophy, in II, XII Advancement of Learning 2 at 122 (G.W. Kitchin, ed., 
J.M. Dent & Sons Limited, 1973). The work was first published in 1605. 
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is reason to doubt it. Here is a passage from Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes' dissent in an early speech case decided in 1919. 
[W]hen men have realized that time-has upset many fighting 
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe 
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate 
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of tl:te market, and that truth is the 
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. 
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.2 
Justice Robert H. Jackson's court opinion in the 1943 flag 
salute case provides an important gloss on Holmes' statement. 
Explaining why public schools could not require anyone to sa-
lute the flag and recite the pledge of allegiance, Jackson wrote: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it 
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein.3 
The American founders' understanding of political truth 
implicitly acknowledged that individuals could define happiness 
largely in terms of their own desires and tastes. Still, America's 
philosophic understanding as a people has shifted from belief in 
a truth based on what it means to be a human being to confi-
dence in progress to a proud affirmation of agreement to dis-
agree. Today, many Americans think that they have no ortho-
doxy, or at least that "under the First Amendment there is no 
such thing as a false idea." 4 This "content neutral" approach to 
the first amendment has led to results that are difficult to recon-
cile with confidence in the "competition of the market," also 
known as the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor. For example, in 
the name of free expression, the Supreme Court has held that 
nude dancin~ is expressive conduct protected by the First 
Amendment. It has also extended constitutional protection to 
2 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). 
3. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
4. This is from justice Powell's court opinion in Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339 
(1974). 
5. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991). The Indiana statute 
requiring the dancers to wear "pasties" and a "G-string" was upheld, 5-4, either on time, 
place and manner grounds, id. at 566, or, with Justice Souter providing the fifth vote, out 
of a legitimate concerns about "secondary effects," such as crime. Id. at 566-69; 582 
(Souter, J., concurring). But the Court also acknowledged that "nude dancing of the kind 
sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the 
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flag burning,6 cross burning and other hate speech,7 pornogra-
phy,8 and unlimited expenditures on political campaigns.9 Virtu-
ally unrestricted freedom seems to have buried any serious pre-
occupation with truth. Yet, the original philosophic arguments 
made on behalf of freedom of speech and religion were quite se-
rious about the pursuit of truth. Apparently something went 
wrong along the way, although the Supreme Court continues to 
assert that "the purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve 
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas, in which truth will ulti-
mately prevail. "10 
First Amendment scholars have pointed out difficulties with 
the "marketplace of ideas" thesis, and they have tended to place 
more emphasis on other justifications for protecting free speech. 
Thus Frederick Schauer writes that the argument assumes "the 
prevalence of reason," without evidence, as well as the "priority 
over other values" of "the search for knowledge." 1 Still, 
Schauer argues that the "focus on the possibility and history of 
error makes us properly wary of entrusting to any governmental 
body the authority to decide what is true and what is false, what 
is right and what is wrong, or what is sound and what is foolish." 
12 Not only is Schauer not troubled by such a contention, he de-
velops the position into a general distrust of government.13 
Schauer connects his general distrust argument to the self-
government argument for free speech,14 but he concludes that 
"the most persuasive argument for a Free Speech Principle is ... 
governmental incompetence."15 If this argument focuses on 
speech, it would seem to be limited to political speech; if it is not 
so limited, then it would seem to apply to regulation of conduct 
First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so." Id. at 566. 
6. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) and United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 
310 (1990). 
7. R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
8. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
9. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
10. Red Lion Broadcasting v. F. C. C., 395 U.S. 367,390 (1969). 
11. Frederick F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 33 (Cambridge U. 
Press, 1982). 
12. Id. at 34. 
13. ld. ("The argument from truth may be based not only on its inherent scepticism 
about human judgment, but also on a more profound scepticism about the motives and 
abilities of those to whom we grant political power. The reason for preferring the mar-
ketplace of ideas to the selection of truth by government may be less the proven ability of 
the former than it is the often evidenced inability of the latter."). 
14. Id. at. 35-46. 
15. ld. at 86. 
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as well; that is, it would be a libertarian argument for minimal 
government. 
Other scholars, such as Edwin Baker and Martin Redish, 
turn to an argument from autonomy or self-realization to sup-
port freedom of speech. Both of these arguments also amount to 
a general liberty argument, however, and thus fail to address 
what is distinctive about freedom of speech.16 Christopher Won-
nell has attempted to defend the marketplace theory, but the ar-
gument is limited to empirically verifiable questions that are 
subject to repeated testing by "elite communities."17 By distin-
guishing between what he calls "the true" from "the good," 
Wonnell has strengthened the case for the marketplace approach 
by narrowing the range of questions to those which can be sub-
ject to verification by testing. But the range of such questions 
may be narrower than he claims. 18 
An examination of the relevant philosophic arguments 
which led to the theory of the marketplace of ideas will allow us 
to separate out the philosophic quest for the truth from the po-
litical objective of establishing civil peace by means of toleration. 
This is important because whatever justifications for the first 
amendment freedoms have merit arise out of, or are related to, 
these two objectives. I will first examine the relevant philo-
sophic arguments and then turn to some important judicial ar-
guments concerning freedom of speech. 
16. See C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech 5 (Oxford U. 
Press, 1989), ("I then argue that the constitutional protection of free speech bars certain 
governmental restrictions on noncoercive, nonviolent, substantively valued conduct, in-
cluding nonverbal conduct."); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 591 (1982). After noting Baker's criticism of the '"marketplace of ideas" notion, 
Redish asserts that the theory can be retained if it is viewed "as a means of facilitating 
the value of self-realization." Id. at 619. 
17. Christopher Wonnell, Truth and the Marketplace of Ideas, 19 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 669 (1986). 
18. Wonnell claims that eventually the truths that are verified by the elite commu-
nities will become dispersed into society at large. His only example, however, is the law 
of supply and demand. Id. at 704. Wonnell writes that Thomas Sowell"s work is "(a]n 
example of a system of ideas that can only be appreciated fully within a demand-for-truth 
paradigm .... Sowell criticizes the 'civil rights vision' that (sic] in its understandable de-
sire for moral condemnation of racism incorrectly attributes the bulk of the disparity in 
the incomes of ethnic groups to present discrimination." Id. at 705. Sowell may be right, 
or more right than his critics, but I don't think that Wonnell has shown how everyone 
must agree with him on the complex question of the relationship between the income of 
ethnic groups, especially African-Americans, and discrimination. 
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II. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
IN MODERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
John Milton's Areopagitica,19 written in 1644, is the first 
work to contain an explicit defense of freedom of speech, in the 
form of freedom of the press. Writing in defense of learning, 
and hence the liberty to publish without prior approval from 
government, Milton urged Parliament to rescind its recently en-
acted licensing law. Milton's argument is famous for its conten-
tion that 
though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon 
the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by li-
censing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and 
Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a 
20 free and open encounter? 
In addition, Milton argues for toleration, and hence for re-
ligious freedom. But each argument is limited: toleration is not 
extended to "popery," while "mischievous and libellous"21 publi-
cations are subject to subsequent punishment. 
Why did Milton place limits on tolerance, if he believed that 
the truth was strong and would prevail over falsehood? Ac-
cording to one explanation, Milton never held to the "truth wins 
out" position; he only presented it for rhetorical purposes, since 
other partisans of toleration who were well respected in Parlia-
ment espoused that view of truth.22 This position emphasizes Mil-
ton's interest in philosophic learning. Another explanation is 
both political and theological. Catholicism threatens the inde-
pendence of England by making a universal claim on the alle-
giance of all Christians, regardless of their citizenship. Theologi-
cally, Milton wrote: "True Religion is the true Worship and 
Service of God, learnt and believed from the Word of God 
only. . . . He hath Reveal'd and taught it us in the holy Scrip-
tures ... with strictest command to reject all other traditions or 
additions whatsoever. "23 Connecting that statement to Milton's 
19. The title refers to Areopagus, a hill in Athens where the highest judicial court 
of the city held its sittings. In particular, Milton is thereby addressing Parliament in the 
manner that !socrates addressed a speech to the Areopagus, which was known as his 
Areopagitic oration. 
20. John Milton, Areopagitica and Of Education 50 (George H. Sabine, ed., Harlan 
Davidson, 1987). 
21. ld. at 52, 55. 
22. Paul M. Dowling, Polite Wisdom: Heathen Rhetoric in Milton's Areopagitica ch. 
7 (Rowman and Littlefield, 1995). 
23. John Milton, Of True Religion, quoted in Ernest Sirlock, ed., II Complete Prose 
Works of John Milton 181 (Don M. Wolfe, et at., eds., Yale U. Press, 1959). 
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contention in Areopagitica that we are "searching what we know 
not, by what we know, still closing up truth to truth as we find 
it ... " yields the conclusion that Roman Catholicism, by denying 
the fundamental thing we know- that divine truth is accessible 
to human beings through scripture, without the authoritative in-
tervention of ecclesiastical authority- does not deserve tolera-
tion and may be proscribed to protect what we already know.24 
Th,e man who initiated the powerful statement that truth wins 
out, by arguing for a qualified tolerance, did not make clear to 
his readers whether he expressed his true convictions in that 
statement or whether he wrote rhetorically. 
One scholar thinks Milton wrote as a believer and that 
nonetheless his argument for freedom of speech is important for 
modern, i.e. liberal, constitutionalism. In a recently published 
talk on Milton's Areopagitica, Vincent Blasi assumes that Milton 
was serious about divine providence and that his non-tolerance 
of Catholics was justified because of their rejection of the su-
premacy of scripture.25 Warning us against "try[ing] to secularize 
Milton," and noting Milton's indebtedness to Machiavelli,26 Blasi 
identifies Milton with the position that "public order, public mo-
rality, and mutual respect among citizens simply cannot be 
achieved by coercive legislation alone."27 For Blasi, who later 
identifies Milton more with Madison than with Mill, and more 
with Justice Black than with Justice Holmes, "the crux of Areop-
agitica ... is that without a robust commitment to free-wheeling 
disputation ... it is impossible to sustain an energetic, adaptive, 
vibrant society. "28 There is something to this, as well as to Blasi's 
sensible concluding statement that Milton was neither a skeptic 
nor a democrat, but was "sympathetic to an aristocracy of 
merit."29 But that description of Milton is fully consistent with a 
far less libertarian position on freedom of speech than is re-
flected in American constitutional law today. 
We do learn from Milton's Areopagitica that taking the 
claim regarding truth's success in the world seriously goes to-
gether with belief in divine providence. In subsequent formula-
tions of the argument, starting with John Locke, the claim re-
24. Sirlock, II Complete Prose Works of John Milton at 181 (cited in note 23). 
25. Milton's Areopagitica and the Modern First Amendment, delivered at Yale Law 
School in March 1995 and published as a Yale Law School Occasional Paper, Second Se-
ries, no. 1, p. 10. Blasi follows Sirlock in his interpretation. 
26. Id. Blasi does not consider that these two positions might be contradictory. 
27. ld. at 16. 
28. ld. at 17 (seep. 19 for the references to Madison, Mill, etc.). 
29. ld. at 18. 
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garding truth winning out is made rhetorically, notwithstanding 
the philosophers' own desire for knowledge. 
In A Letter Concerning Toleration, published in 1690, John 
Locke argued for the complete separation of religion, whose ju-
risdiction was salvation of the soul, from government, whose ju-
risdiction was the body. The magistrate, Locke argued, should 
manifest no concern for speculative doctrines, since they do not 
pertain to the civil interests of "life, liberty, health and indolency 
of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, 
lands, houses, furniture and the like. "30 In addition, "the care of 
the souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his 
power consists only in outward force; but true and saving relig-
ion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which 
nothing can be acceptable to God. "31 Furthermore, even if laws 
with penalties could change men's minds, they could not help "in 
the salvation of their souls." 
Locke defined a church as a "voluntary society of men, 
joining themselves together of their own accord, in order to the 
public worshipping of God .... "32 Since the church is a private 
association, it is not bound by the duty of toleration to retain 
anyone who "offend(s) against the laws of the society," but its 
power is limited to excommunication.33 As for the magistrate, he 
may teach or admonish but he may not prescribe by laws and 
compel by punishment in the matter of an individual's soul. This 
point is made first with respect to forms and rites of worship and 
then with respect to doctrines. 
The forms of worship must be voluntary to be pleasing to 
God. Locke says that human authority cannot make "indifferent 
things" "any part of the Worship of God," since such thi~s can-
not "by any Virtue of their own ... propitiate the Deity." Since 
Locke holds that every part of the ceremonial, or outward, wor-
ship of God involves indifferent things, each church is free to 
worship as it pleases, so long as the magistrate does not have a 
legitimate reason to interfere. "The only business of the Church 
is the salvation of souls; and it no ways concerns the common-
wealth or any member of it, that this or the other ceremony be 
30. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 26 (James H. Tully, ed., Hackett 
Pub. Co., 1983). 
31. Id. at 27. 
32. Id. at 28. 
33. ld. at 30. 
34. Id. at 40. 
332 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol.15:325 
there made use of. "35 Locke uses the washin~ of an infant with 
water as his example of "an indifferent thing." If the magistrate 
thought it was necessary to prevent disease, a law could order 
washing, but not baptism. Government may not require baptism 
or interfere with baptism. Hence, Jews may not be forced to un-
dergo baptism. Likewise, the religious use of bread and wine is 
not a concern of government; "both [are] in their own nature 
and in the ordinary occasions of life, altogether indifferent. "37 
Locke distinguishes the circumstances of worship from the fact 
of worship itself; the latter only seems to be appointed by God, 
whereas the former are particular instances of "things indiffer-
ent." Lest he be misunderstood about the limits of religious 
freedom in the matter of rituals, Locke makes clear that animal 
sacrifices are altogether different, from the perspective of gov-
ernment, from human sacrifices.38 For Locke, the government 
has primary responsibility for deciding what can and must be 
done; it includes those actions which preserve each individual's 
natural rights, his life, liberty, and estate. 
Turning from conduct to opinion, Locke distinguishes be-
tween speculative and practical articles of religion; of the former, 
Locke says that since they "terminate simply in the understand-
ing" they are "required only to be believed," and are not the 
concern of government. In his elaboration, Locke draws on Mil-
ton's argument concerning the truth. 
The magistrate ought not to forbid the preaching or profess-
ing of any speculative opinions in any church, because they 
have no manner of relation to the civil rights of the subjects. 
If a Roman Catholick believe that to be really the Body of 
Christ, which another man calls bread, he does not injury 
thereby to his neighbor ... The power of the magistrate, and 
the estates of the people, may be equally secure whether any 
man believes these things or no. I readily grant that these 
opinions are false and absurd. But the business of laws is not 
to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and se-
curity of the commonwealth, and of every particular mans 
goods and person. And so it ought to be. For truth certainly 
would do well enough, if she were once left to shift for her-
self .... Thus much for speculative opinions. Let us now pro-
d . l 39 cee to practlca ones. 
35. ld. at 39. 
36. ld. at 40. 
37. ld. 
38. ld. at 41·2. 
39. Id. at 46. 
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Locke's apparent confidence in truth's winning out can also 
be understood as his indifference to such speculative inquiries. 
Whatever the results of such speculations, which he has equated 
with faith, they cannot be imposed upon anyone else. Also, 
since Locke does not tire of reminding us that each person is or-
thodox to himself, we must wonder whether he thinks that 
speculation concerning the soul, and hence the divine, can lead 
to knowledge. In other words, Locke's use of Milton's phrase 
about truth winning out in a contest with falsehood is presented 
rhetorically: his intent is to make sure that doctrinal division 
does not upset civil peace by becoming a part of governmental 
strife. 
This interpretation is confirmed by examining Locke's dis-
cussion of practical opinions, which "influence the will and man-
ners" of men. After acknowledging that "moral actions be-
long ... to the jurisdiction both of the outward and the inward 
court . . . both of the magistrate and conscience, "40 Locke pro-
ceeds to limit concerns of the soul to salvation and hence to the 
individual, leaving government to deal with life "here upon 
earth. "41 Since men are apt to prey upon the fruits of other 
men's labors, this requires the establishment of civil society. 
Locke's account thus reduces the soul to a self which pursues in-
terests connected to desires of the body.42 
Having applied his principle of toleration to religious con-
duct and opinions, Locke addresses the question, "what if the 
magistrate should enjoin any thing by his authority that appears 
unlawful to the conscience of a private person?"43 Locke replies 
that if government is faithfully administered "this will seldom 
happen." But if it does, "such a private person," should abstain 
from the action but undergo the punishment.44 
But suppose the people at large, not just one private person, 
disagree with the government? Here Locke offers his dissolu-
tion of government argument in miniature. "Who shall be judge 
40. ld. 
41. Id. at 47. 
42. See Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., The Religious Issue and the Origin of Modern 
Constitutionalism in America's Constitutional Soul 101, 103 (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 
1991). 
43. Locke, A Leller Concerning Toleration at 48 (cited in note 30). 
44. This argument resembles the civil disobedience arguments of Thoreau and Mar-
tin Luther King; but whereas Thoreau and King identify civil disobedience with the re-
quirements of justice, Locke acknowledges that justice may lie with the government and 
still conflict with the claim of conscience. For Locke's account of what must be done if 
the government truly acts unjustly, see my next paragraph. 
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between them? I answer, God alone. For there is no Judge 
upon earth between the Supreme magistrate and the people. "45 
Since the people have the ultimate authority, by virtue of the 
natural right of each to provide for his preservation, they collec-
tively have the right to displace government. 
What confuses the argument is Locke's reference to God, 
or, as he says in the Second Treatise, to Heaven. Recalling 
Locke's treatment of speculative opinions, that they are private 
matters between the individual and his God, not the concern of 
government, we wonder how a political teaching could then take 
divine providence seriously. If everyone is orthodox to himself, 
will not everyone think he has God on his side? Locke's teach-
ing is based on the truth about the goods of this life, not salva-
tion in an afterlife. At the same time, his rhetorical treatment of 
truth shifting for itself in the matter of speculative religious 
opinions has the effect of freeing philosophers such as himself 
from the constraints of overreaching theocracy. 
Locke's teaching on toleration thus contains a principled ac-
count of the different jurisdictions of government and religion 
and it offers a subtle form of conflict resolution between individ-
ual conscience and the authority of government. Locke, like 
Milton, placed limits on tolerance, but in this case the limits were 
clearly in the service of establishing the principle of tolerance. 
For example, Locke wrote that "those are not at all to be 
tolerated who deny the being of a God," since "promises, cove-
nants, and oaths, which are the bonds of humane society, can 
have no hold upon an Atheist. "46 
Some might say that the restriction is meaningless since the 
untrustworthy atheists will lie. But Locke has in mind the posi-
tive effect on the habits of most citizens of knowing that gov-
ernment distrusts anyone who publicly denies the existence of 
God. This is what is known as "civil religion." Today we rely en-
tirely on voluntary means of cementing support for public spirit-
edness. 
Locke's toleration argument entered American constitu-
tionalism through the efforts of Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison. Jefferson's draft of the Bill for Establishing Religious 
Freedom, in Virginia, which was written in 1779, included this 
statement. 
45. ld. at 49. 
46. ld. at 51. 
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[T)hat our civil rights have no dependance [sic) on our relig-
ious opinions, any more than our opinions in physics or ge-
ometry; that therefore the proscribing any citizen as unworthy 
the public confidence by laying upon him an incapacity of 
being called to offices of trust and emolument, unless he pro-
fess or renounce this or that religious opinion, is depriving 
him injuriously of those privileges and advantages to which, in 
common with his fellow citizens, he has a natural right; ... 
that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil gov-
ernment for its officers to interfere when principles break out 
into overt acts against peace and good order; and finally, that 
truth is great and will prevail if left to herself; that she is the 
proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to 
fear from the conflict unless by human interposition disarmed 
of her natural weapons, free argument and debate; errors 
ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contra-
dict them.47 
335 
Jefferson's confidence in truth winning out was limited to 
religious opinions. Sound political opinions may require an act 
of revolution, a successful party organization and political cam-
paign, complete with republican creed, as well as the enforce-
ment of state libel laws for their maintenance. In his reliance on 
truth prevailing in the matter of religious opinions, Jefferson was 
every bit as rhetorical as Locke. 
Six years later Madison wrote his Memorial and Remon-
strance against a proposal for public funds to support religious 
instruction. The twelfth paragraph contained this argument 
against the Bill. 
Because, the policy of the bill is adverse to the diffusion of the 
light of Christianity .... [The Bill] at once discourages those 
who are strangers to the light of [revelation) from coming into 
the Region of it .... Instead of levelling as far as possible, 
every obstacle to the victorious progress of truth, the Bill with 
an ignoble and unchristian timidity would circumscribe it, 
with a wall of defence, against the encroachments of error.48 
In her essay on Madison's Memorial, Eva Brann compares 
this passage to Jefferson's more famous passage, quoted above. 
47. Merrill D. Peterson, ed., The Ponable Thomas Jefferson 252-53 (Viking Press, 
1975). 
48. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance in Marvin Meyers, ed., The Mind 
of the Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison 14-15 (Bobbs-Merrill, 
1973). 
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The final sentence of the Christian section [of the Memorial] 
is reminiscent of the great peroration of Jefferson's bill estab-
lishing religious freedom ... , except that the truth of this 
paragraph is truth of revelation, and the freedom here called 
for Christian liberty, a very Madisonian harmonizin~ of the 
spirit of enlightenment and the claims of Christianity.4 
The author of that commentary leaves it to the reader to deter-
mine whether that harmonizing is possible, and whether Madi-
son truly thought it was. 
Benedict de Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise, pub-
lished in 1670, extends the argument for toleration into the 
sphere of political opinion. While Locke discusses the impor-
tance of political opinions in connection with the relationship be-
tween the people and their representatives, Spinoza's argument 
concerning the desirability of democracy gives more prominence 
to freedom of speech.50 Spinoza, like Locke and Milton before 
him, argues on behalf of philosophic freedom. His free speech 
argument addresses a very important political consideration not 
found in Locke or Milton however. 
The first and most important argument Spinoza makes con-
cerns the proper separation between philosophy and theology, 
which he identifies with the spheres of truth and faith respec-
tively. Spinoza's way of establishing religious toleration is first 
to reduce theology to a few simple moral precepts, or dogmas, as 
he also calls them. They amount to little more than Locke's in-
sistence that one not deny the existence of God. Then, the de-
finitive interpretation of these dogmas is entrusted to the sover-
eign, the democratic government, in no uncertain terms. 
We may now see in a clearer light ... that all the decrees of 
God involve eternal truth and necessity, so that we cannot 
conceive God as a prince or legislator giving laws to mankind. 
For this reason the Divine precepts, whether revealed through 
our natural faculties, or through prophets, do not receive im-
mediately from God the force of a command, but only from 
those, or through the mediation of those, who possess the 
49. Eva Brann, Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance," A Model of American 
Eloquence in Glenn Thurow and Jeffrey D. Wallin, eds., Rhetoric and American States-
manship 35 (Carolina Academic Press, 1984), reprinted in Pamela Kraus, ed., The Past-
Present: Selected Writings of Eva Brann (St. John's College Press, 1997). Where I have 
placed ellipses in the text, Brann quotes Jefferson that "truth is great and will prevail if 
left to herself .... " See text above at note 47. 
50. Spinoza was the first philosopher to argue that democracy was the best form of 
government. I owe this observation to Leo Strauss, who made it while teaching a semi-
nar on Spinoza in 1959, at the University of Chicago. 
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right of ruling and legislating. It is only through these latter 
means that God rules among men, and direct human affairs 
with justice and equity.51 
Spinoza goes on to say: 
This conclusion is supported by experience, for we find traces 
of Divine justice only in places where just men bear sway; 
elsewhere the same lot (to repeat again Solomon's words) be-
falls the just and the unjust, the pure and the impure: a state 
of things which causes Divine Providence to be doubted by 
many who think that God immediately reigns among men, 
and directs all nature for their benefit. 52 
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This argument for absolute obedience to democratic gov-
ernment started from the realist premise that might makes right, 
or that by natural right the big fish eat the small fish. When in-
dividuals reflect on their hopes and fears, they will conclude, 
Spinoza argues, that the rational society would have to be a de-
mocracy, where the body politic wields the power of each to-
gether for the sake of the security of each severally. Spinoza's 
argument for freedom of speech begins this way. 
No, the object of government is not to change men from ra-
tional beings into beasts or puppets, but to enable them to de-
velope their minds and bodies in security, and to employ their 
reason unshackled; neither showing hatred, anger, or deceit, 
nor watched with the eyes of jealou~ and injustice. In fact, 
the true aim of government is liberty. 
Spinoza can identify democracy with rationality, which 
surely distinguishes his political philosophy from that of Plato 
and Aristotle, on the basis of his previous limitation of rational-
ity to instrumental calculations concerning one's hopes and 
fears. Spinoza's earlier account of the objects of desire started 
with the knowledge of things through their primary causes. He 
also indicated that the ends of government are security and com-
fort,54 which means that government's ends are necessarily lim-
ited from the perspective of the development of the mind. They 
are instrumentally rational or sub-rational, as they take their 
bearings from the desires for security and comfort. This is the 
source of our self-deception regarding the relationship between 
51. Benedict de Spinoza, A Theologico-Political Treatise in 1 The Chief Works of 
Benedict de Spinoza 248 (R.H. M. Elwes, trans., George Bell and Sons, 1883). 
52. ld. at 249. 
53. Id. at 259. 
54. ld. at 47. 
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political freedom and rationality, and hence between political 
freedom and the truth. Philosophers, in order to make the world 
safe for philosophy, need to restrain religion, in so far as re-
vealed religion threatens philosophy. In Spinoza's view, the re-
straining of religion seems to require making an argument 
against any hierarchical government, lest it be ecclesiastical. 
Hence he is the first philosopher to argue the superiority of de-
mocracy to all other forms of government. Democratic freedom 
will serve rational self-development, but, if we read carefully, we 
learn that it is only instrumental rationality, i.e. this reason is in 
the service of a secure and healthy life, not knowledge of things 
through their primary causes.55 
Spinoza 's argument for freedom of speech has a special 
twist which reflects the character of democratic rationality. Spi-
noza starts with a statement in support of moderate restraints on 
the expression of opinions. Men should not deny the supremacy 
of government and they should acknowledge that promises 
should be kept. But Spinoza goes on to qualify this argument, in 
the name of what works, and here we note that the hard surfaced 
realist has a soft, pragmatic core. 
If we hold to the principle that a man's loyalty to the state 
should be judged, like his loyalty to God, from his actions 
only-namely from his charity towards his neighbors; we can-
not doubt that the best government will allow freedom of 
philosophical speculation as well as religious belief . . . He 
who seeks to regulate everything by law, is more likely to 
arouse vices than to reform them. It is best to grant what 
cannot be abolished, even though it be in itself harmful. ... 
It is far from possible to impose uniformity of speech, for 
the more rulers strive to curtail freedom of speech, the more 
obstinately are they resisted; not indeed by the avaricious, the 
flatterers, and other numskulls ... but by those whom good 
education, sound morality, and virtue have rendered more 
free. Men, as generally constituted, are most prone to resent 
the branding as criminal of opinions which they believe to be 
true, and the proscription as wicked of that which inspires 
them with piety towards God and man; hence they are ready 
to forswear the laws and conspire against the authorities, 
thinking it not shameful but honorable to stir up seditions and 
perpetuate any sort of crime with this end in view. Such being 
55. For Spinoza, philosophy may be said to encompass the highest object of legiti-
mate desire, whereas the object of government is limited to security and comfort. Id. at 
45,47. 
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the constitution of human nature, we see that laws directed 
against opinions affect the generous-minded rather than the 
wicked, and are adapted less for coercing criminals than for 
irritating the upright; so that they cannot be maintained with-
out great peril to the state.'" 
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In other words, precisely because most men are governed by 
their passions rather than their reason, any attempt to restrain 
the expression of the form or content of opinion is likely to be 
met with such a spirited opposition-from the respectable mem-
bers of society as well as the low-lifes- that as a practical matter 
it is better to limit the restraints of law to overt acts. Spinoza can 
therefore be credited with presenting the first philosophic argu-
ment in support of both democracy and freedom of speech. The 
argument deliberately blurs the distinction between philosophy 
and politics by equating the rational life with the successful pur-
suit of material well-being. The free speech argument has noth-
ing to do with truth winning out in the marketplace but rather 
with the kinds of restraints that most people will accept. 
In turning from Locke and Spinoza to John Stuart Mill, we 
turn from the philosophic sources for the American founders to 
the philosophic source for the modern Supreme Court in its 
treatment of freedom of speech. In On Liberty, published in 
1859, Mill assumed the soundness of his predecessors' toleration 
argument and extended the marketplace of ideas argument from 
speculative religious opinions to all political opinions. Since 
Mill's argument for freedom of speech depends upon his larger 
argument, for individual autonomy, I want to start there. 
Mill writes that the object of his essay is to assert one prin-
ciple, "that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, indi-
vidually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of 
any of their number, is self-protection."57 Considered in isola-
tion, this statement resembles the liberal arguments of Locke 
and Spinoza. But Mill's position differs from theirs, as the next 
passage indicates. 
The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative 
feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exer-
cised only in making a choice. He who does anything because 
it is the custom, makes no choice. He gains no practice either 
in discerning or in desiring what is best. The mental and 
56. !d. at 261-62. 
57. John Stuart Mill, On Libeny and Other Writings 13 (Stefan Collini, ed., Cam-
bridge U. Press, 1989). 
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mora!~ like the muscular powers, are improved only by being 
used. 
Mill assumes that moral habits develop the same way that 
intellectual faculties do. What accounts for his sanguine view 
concerning the results of the fullest freedom of action as well as 
opinion? The answer lies in Mill's two-part account of human 
nature. First, Mill likens human nature "not [to] a machine to be 
built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for 
it, but [to] a tree, which requires to grow and develope (sic] itself 
on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which 
make it a living thing."59 Mill emphasizes the "inward forces," 
rather than the natural term of a tree's growth, as in "from acorn 
to oak." Hence, he focuses on desires and impulses, not under-
standing and restraint. "To say that one person's desires and 
feelings are stronger and more various than those of another, is 
merely to say that he has more of the raw material of human na-
ture, and is therefore capable, perhaps of more evil, but certainly 
of more good. "60 
Other philosophers also acknowledged the force of human 
passions. Moreover, modem political philosophy focuses on 
having passion control passion (or ambition control ambition as 
Madison put it in the Federalist Papers ).61 But whereas Hobbes, 
Locke, and Spinoza recognized the need to control passion with 
strong government, Mill denies there is any conflict between the 
strong individual and peace and security. He also prefers the 
Athenian statesman Pericles over either the brilliant but immod-
erate Athenian Alcibiades or the Christian John Knox,62 without 
explaining why, on his own terms, we should not prefer the no-
ble if audacious Alcibiades, who, after all, always lands on his 
feet. 
Mill claims that whatever restrictions are dictated by his 
principle of no harm to others benefit the social part of the indi-
vidual. This is difficult to accept, especially when we consider 
that Mill allows society to require each able bodied individual to 
help provide for the common defense.63 After rejecting tradition 
and custom, and thus habit, as a ground of restraint of one's pas-
sions, Mill expects his individuals to agree "[t]o be held to rigid 
58. ld. at 59. 
59. Id. at 60. 
60. ld. 
61. See Federalist 51 (Madison). 
62. Mill, On Libeny at 63 (cited in note 57). 
63. Id. at 75. 
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rules of justice for the sake of others," since it "developes [sic] 
the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for 
their object."64 But Mill's entire argument has minimized the ex-
tent to which the community, and hence the good of others, con-
tributes to individual self-fulfillment. It seems that Mill did not 
want to have to acknowledge that the good life as he describes it 
puts individuals in direct conflict with one another. 
. Likewise, Mill's argument for freedom of opinion fails to 
distinguish between the conditions under which reasoned argu-
ment can succeed and the character of political debate. Mill's 
account of the case for reasoned inquiry, with a willingness tore-
consider the grounds of one's position, resonates well in colleges 
and universities, since, after all, that is what liberal education is 
all about. But political debate is different; the primary object is 
to persuade, not to instruct,65 and the focus of debate is not ordi-
narily the very foundations of civil society, as it often is in a work 
of political philosophy. 
Mill frames his argument for liberty of opinion this way. 
First, the opinion that is suppressed may be true, and society will 
be the loser thereby; second, the opinion that is supported as or-
thodox may be correct, but it will become a lifeless truth if it is 
taken for granted, and not fought for against other opinions. 
Third, and most commonly, the silenced opinion may contain a 
part of the truth, which will likewise be lost on society.66 Mill 
contends that eventually truth will prevail in a condition of free-
dom. 
It is a piece of idle sentimentality that truth, merely as truth, 
has any inherent power denied to error, of prevailing against 
the dungeon and the stake. Men are not more zealous for 
truth than they often are for error, and a sufficient application 
of legal or even of social penalties will generally succeed in 
stopping the propagation of either. The real advantage which 
truth has, consists in this, that when an opinion is true, it may 
be extinguished once, twice, or many times, but in the course 
of ages there will generally be found persons to rediscover it, 
until some one of its reappearances falls on a time when from 
favourable circumstances it escapes persecution until it has 
64. ld. at 63. 
65. The deliberations over the framing and ratifying of the American Constitution 
are an excellent example of high toned political talk. This is especially true of the discus-
sions recorded by James Madison at the Federal Convention, but that Convention met in 
secret and the framers agreed to keep their deliberations confidential, which they did. 
66. See Mill, On Libeny at 20, 37, 47, 53-54 (cited in note 57). 
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made such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to 
• 67 
suppress 1t. 
Later, Mill writes that 
[a]s mankind improve, the number of doctrines which are no 
longer disputed or doubted will be constantly on the increase: 
and the well-being of mankind may almost be measured by 
the number and gravity of the truths which have reached the 
point of being uncontested.68 
Recall that when Milton referred to truth winning out, he 
either had in mind divine providence or he was writing rhetori-
cally, as Locke did after him. So what does Mill have in mind 
here? For someone who advocates full discussion to maintain 
the vitality of human thought, Mill is surprisingly circumspect on 
this point. It turns out that Mill identifies political truths with 
those opinions that satisfy needs, which he believes gradually 
gain acceptance. He does not consider whether certain needs 
should be repressed rather than satisfied, either in the name of 
soul or out of commitment to country. 
For example, he supports Socrates as a constructive gadfly, 
without discussing, let alone criticizing, Socrates' refusal to 
challenge the Athenians religious beliefs or Socrates' many indi-
cations that philosophic inquiry and politics are necessarily in 
tension with one another.69 He credits Rousseau's reservations 
against the Enlightenment as constructive prods to further 
thinking, although he dismisses Rousseau as more wrong than 
right, without for a moment considering the latter's discussion of 
the problem of vanity and the essential difference between indi-
vidual and civil freedom.70 He describes the Old Testament as 
"in many respects barbarous."71 His account of the moral teach-
ings of the New Testament is more politic, but also quite reveal-
ing. While "the sayings of Christ are . . . irreconcilable with 
nothing which a comprehensive morality requires," nonetheless 
"many essential elements of the highest morality are among the 
things which are not provided for ... in the recorded deliver-
67. ld. at 31. 
68. ld. at 45. 
69. See Plato's Apology of Socrates, 26a-27e, 30d-32a in Thomas G. West and 
Grace Starry West, trans., Four Texts on Socrates (Cornell U. Press, 1984). 
70. See Jean Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Ine-
quality Among Men part 1 in Rosseau, The First and Second Discourse 128-32 (Roger 
Masters, ed., St. Martin's Press, 1964), and Rousseau, 2 On the Social Contract 68 (Roger 
Masters, ed., St. Martin's Press, 1978). 
71. Mill, On Liberty at 50 (cited in note 57). 
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ances of the Founder of Christianity ... "72 Mill's Christian mo-
rality will be limited to not harming others; it will not ask more 
of human beings. From the Christian perspective, not harming 
others does not suffice. From the perspective of the passions, 
which appears to be that of Mill, the only reason for not harming 
others is fear of retaliation. 
Mill refuses to acknowledge any conflict between self de-
velopment as he describes it and the requirements of society; 
however, notwithstanding his description of "desires and feel-
ings," as the "raw material of human nature," he claims that re-
straints on such inclinations for the sake of the development of 
others give an individual "a full equivalent in the better devel-
opment of the social part of his nature ... "73 
Mill wrote that given time and freedom, we will come to ad-
here to the principle of toleration of diverse views on how one 
should live so that each may live freely and society as a whole 
may benefit from that energy. The difficulty is that some men 
may genuinely desire to rule over others and have to be stopped, 
and stopping them may require a dedication to certain opinions 
that will support a willingness to fight for them. Mill did not ig-
nore this problem completely. He simply thought it was time 
enough for society to act when opinions or speech broke out into 
overt action. 
An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that 
private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when 
simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur pun-
ishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled 
before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about 
among the same mob in the form of a placard. 74 
As a rule of governmental action in an extreme case, this 
has much to commend it, and we will turn to such examples from 
American constitutional law shortly. My major interest in Mill, 
however, has been to demonstrate that his confidence in the 
eventual winning out of truth in the marketplace of ideas is as 
unfounded as is his confidence in individualism unrestrained by 
custom or tradition or government. 
72. ld. at 51. 
73. ld. at 60, 63. 
74. Id. at 56. 
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III. THE PHILOSOPHIC CONTRIBUTION TO FREEDOM 
OF SPEECH IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
How do these philosophic arguments concerning toleration 
manifest themselves in American constitutional controversies? I 
will discuss Madison's response to the Sedition Act of 1798, a 
modern application of that controversy, and the major "clear 
and present danger" cases. I intend to show that the best de-
fense of freedom of speech is related to modern republican, or 
free, government, but this does not assume that the more the 
speech the more likely the truth, especially the truth about poli-
tics, will be known and accepted. 
The Sedition Act of 1798, passed in the midst of party con-
flict, especially over the government's policy toward Revolution-
ary France, prohibited both conduct and language directed 
against the government.75 This included not only the counseling 
of insurrection or rioting or unlawful assembly, but also the 
writing or publishing or knowing aiding in the publishing of 
any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against 
the government of the United States, or either house of Con-
gress ... or the President ... with intent to defame ... or to 
bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute ... 
or to excite against them ... the hatred of the good people of 
the United States .... 76 
Since the Federalist advocates called the Republicans the 
party of France,77 it was clear that this law was to be used as a 
vehicle for partisan suppression of the political opposition. 
In opposing the Sedition Act/8 Madison argued that the 
English common law rule of "no prior restraint," in the form of 
75. See James Morton Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and 
American Civil Liberties 6 (Cornell U. Press, 1956). 
76. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, 1 Stat. 
596-97 ( 1798). 
77. Smith quotes Federalist John Allen criticizing Republican leader Albert 
Gallatin as follows: "Were France herself to speak through an American mouth ... I 
cannot conceive what she would say more than what we have heard from certain gentle-
men to effect her purposes." Smith, Freedom's Fetters at 14-15 (cited in note 75). 
78. Jefferson and Madison, who led the Republican opposition to the Alien and 
Sedition laws, placed great weight on states' rights, or federalism, arguments; they 
claimed that the enumerated powers of Congress did not extend to the regulation of the 
press, and that the first amendment was passed to make that fact crystal clear. Walter 
Berns has emphasized that this was the basis of their opposition in his article, Freedom of 
the Press and the Alien and Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal in Philip B. Kurland, ed., The 
Supreme Coun Review (U. of Chicago Press, 1970); he reiterates his point in a revised 
version of this article, published in his book, The First Amendment and the Future of 
American Democracy 80-146 (Basic Books, 1976). Leonard Levy, whose book, Legacy of 
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licensing requirements for publications, was an inadequate un-
derstanding of freedom of speech if subsequent punishment was 
available. This was especially true in America, Madison argued, 
because republican government was based on popular sover-
eignty, not Parliamentary supremacy, and the people therefore 
had to be permitted to criticize the government and its officials.79 
Noting that "[s)ome degree of abuse is inseparable from the 
proper use of everything," Madison thinks "it is better to leave a 
few of [the press's) noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, 
than, by pruning them away, to injure the vigor of those yielding 
the proper fruits. And can the wisdom of this policy be doubted 
by any one who reflects that to the press alone, checkered as it is 
with abuses, the world is indebted for all the triumphs which 
have been gained by reason and humanity over error and op-
pression .... "80 Here Madison expresses some confidence in 
truth's winning out, at least within the context of political speech 
concerning the government and its policies. The implicit as-
sumption of government by consent is that the people are able, 
with appropriate information, to judge those who will be delib-
erating and deciding government action in their name. Madison 
thinks that injury to reputation by private defamations can be 
dealt with in the state courts, by ordinary libellaws.81 
The Sedition Act liberalized the common law rule on libel 
by making truth a defense and assigning the decision on the law 
and the fact to the jury. Madison's explanation for the insuffi-
ciency of such a rule reveals a serious problem for the contention 
that speech is protected only because truth wins out. First, the 
burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove all his conten-
tions. Second, "opinions and inferences, and conjectural obser-
vations," Madison writes, "cannot be subjects of that kind of 
proof which appertain to facts before a court of law." Finally, 
there is no way to punish an "intent to defame ... without strik-
Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History (Harvard U. Press, 
1960), fully revised as Emergence of a Free Press (Oxford, 1995), has demonstrated that 
the American framers did not repudiate the law of seditious libel when they enacted the 
first amendment, has argued that "the (Sedition Act] provoked American libertarians to 
formulate a broad definition of the meaning and scope of liberty of expression for the 
first time in our history." Le\·y, The Emergence of a Free Press at 282. Levy's evidence 
includes the Virginia Report, which Madison authored for the Virginia House of Dele-
gates in the 1799-1800 Session. My discussion draws on the arguments Madison made in 
that Report which focused on the meaning of freedom of speech in America. 
79. Madison, The Virginia Report, 1799-1800 in Meyers, ed., The Mind of the Foun-
der at 330 (cited in note 48). 
80. ld. at 332. 
81. Id. at 336. 
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ing at the right of freely discussing public characters and meas-
ures; because those who engage in such discussions must expect 
and intend to excite these unfavorable sentiments, so far as they 
may be thought to be deserved. "82 
The Supreme Court drew on Madison's argument in its im-
portant New York Times v Sullivan decision, which held that 
"the Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for 
libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their 
official conduct. "83 The new federal rule "prohibits a public offi-
cial from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relat-
ing to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement 
was made with 'actual malice'- that is, with knowledge that it 
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or 
not. "84 After noting that the controversy over the Sedition Act 
"first crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of 
the first Amendment," Justice William Brennan, writing the 
court opinion, quoted from Madison on the people's "censorial 
power ... over the Government. "85 , 
The Court extended constitutional protection to defendants 
charged with libeling a public official, precisely on the grounds 
that to award substantial punitive damages-the amount in Sul-
livan itself was $500,000-for errors of fact that were clearly no 
more than negligent, not reckless or malicious, was to chill public 
criticism of government just as much as seditious libel laws did. 
The Sedition Act of 1798 did not get into the courts but it 
did lapse in 1801. Thomas Jefferson also pardoned those still in 
prison under the act. The Supreme Court did not get to consider 
subversive speech cases until 1919. Three cases-Schenck, 
Frohwerk, and Debs-arose under the Espionage Act of 1917, 
and a fourth, Abrams, involved a 1918 amendment to that Act 
which is also known as a sedition act. The first three cases in-
volved convictions for willfully obstructing, recruiting or inciting 
insubordination or disloyalty by circulating pamphlets or news-
papers or making speeches in opposition to the war. Justice 
Holmes wrote the majority opinion upholding the convictions, 
against a free speech defense, in each case. His Schenck opinion 
contained the following statement: 
82. ld. at 340 (emphasis added). 
83. 376 u.s. 254,283 (1%4). 
84. ld. at 279-80. 
85. Id. at 273, 275. 
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The most stringent protection of free speech would not pro-
tect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a 
panic .... The question in every case is whether the words 
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature 
as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring 
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre-
vent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation 
is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are 
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be 
endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard 
them as protected by any constitutional right. ... The stat-
ute ... punishes conspiracies to obstruct as well as actual ob-
struction. If the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) its ten-
dency and the intent with which it is done are the same, we 
perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants 
making the act a crime.86 
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The most baffling aspect of Holmes' opinions was that after 
enunciating his "clear and present danger test," he applied it as 
no more than a "bad tendency" test. Earlier, in 1917, federal 
district judge Learned Hand had interpreted the Espionage Act 
narrowly in a civil case. Distinguishing between words as "the 
keys of persuasion," and others as "triggers of action," Hand 
found the paper's articles and cartoons, which were critical of 
the war effort, outside the statute's reach. 
Political agitation, by the passions it arouses or the convic-
tions it engenders, may in fact stimulate men to the violation 
of law .... Yet to assimilate agitation, legitimate as such, with 
direct incitement to violent resistance, is to disregard the tol-
erance of all methods of political agitation which in normal 
times is a safeguard of free government. The distinction is not 
a scholastic subterfuge, but a hard-bought acquisition in the 
fight for freedom, and the purpose to disregard it must be 
evident when the power exists. If one stops short of urging 
upon others that it is their duty or their interest to resist the 
law, it seems to me one should not be held to have attempted 
to cause its violation.87 
Hand's statement resembles both Spinoza's and Madison's 
arguments for freedom of speech. Hand, who corresponded 
with Holmes about freedom of speech, never did persuade the 
Justice of the merits of the "incitement" approach. However, af-
86. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,52 (1919). 
87. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. Rep. 535,540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
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ter his exchange with Hand, Holmes at least took his own test 
seriously enough to dissent in the Abrams case. 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me per-
fectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your 
power and want a certain result with all your heart you natu-
rally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposi-
tion. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that 
you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he 
has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole-
heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power 
or your premises. But when men have realized that time has 
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even 
more than they believe the very foundations of their own 
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by 
free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their 
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory 
of our Constitution.88 
As Yosal Rogat and James M. O'Fallon have pointed out, 
this famous opinion remains puzzling. First, support for diver-
sity of expression of dissident views should have precluded 
Holmes from saying what he did about the logic of persecution.89 
Second, earlier in his dissent, Holmes reaffirmed the correctness 
of the Court's (and his) Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs opinions, 
and he treated an intent to bring about a substantive evil as the 
same as a clear and present danger of the same.90 Nonetheless, 
in this opinion Holmes brings Mill's major justification for free-
dom of speech into American constitutional law, modestly dis-
claiming any originality by identifying the position with the the-
ory of our Constitution. But if the Constitution looks up to the 
self evident truths of the Declaration of Independence, can it 
also reflect the theory that truth wins out in the marketplace of 
ideas? Moreover, does Holmes truly believe what he says others 
"may come to believe," concerning the power of truth in the 
market place of ideas? Note that from Madison's perspective, 
which reflects Locke and Spinoza, all four of these cases involve 
political speech critical of government and its policies. Abrams' 
call for a general strike, without any specific plans to cause the 
action to occur, resembles the kind of exuberant political expres-
88. Abrams v. United States 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919). 
89. Yosal Rogat and James M. O'Fallon, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opin· 
ion- The Speech Cases, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1349, 1388 (July 1984). 
90. ld. at 1387. 
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sion that both Spinoza and Madison thought it best to allow in 
the name of democratic freedom. In Mill's terms-and Holmes' 
test reflects this approach-it is a far cry from speaking to a mob 
in front of a corn dealer's house and calling corn dealers starvers 
of the poor. The different approaches to free speech support the 
same position in this case, but the Mill-Holmes approach makes 
the greater, and I believe insupportable claim, that freedom of 
expression eventually leads to truth, with no threat to political 
freedom, as long as the expression does not constitute a "clear 
and present danger" of violence. 
The next two free speech cases, Gitlow v. New York91 and 
Whitney v. California, 92 involved free speech challenges to state 
sedition laws. Justice Holmes' dissent in Gitlow and Justice 
Brandeis' virtual dissent in Whitney continued to assert the 
speech protective position that Holmes first stated in Abrams, 
and that Hand presented, emphasizing incitement, in his Masses 
opinion. While each Justice concurred in the other's opinion, 
the opinions offer different rationales. In Gitlow, Holmes offers 
a revised version of his Abrams expression of confidence in the 
marketplace of ideas. 
The only difference between the expression of an opinion and 
an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusi-
asm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason. But 
whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse before 
us it had no chance of starting a present conflagration. If in 
the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship 
are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the 
community, the only meaning of free speech is that they 
should be given their chance and have their way.93 
From this statement, it is clear that Holmes was no longer 
serious (if he ever was) about his contention, in Abrams, that 
truth wins out in the marketplace. Differently stated, for 
Holmes the "truth" refers to the social equivalent of a "resultant 
of forces" in physics, and that may or may not be compatible 
with liberal democracy. Holmes must have lost interest in con-
cealing his position, for now he says, in effect, "Frankly, my fel-
low citizens, I just don't give a damn,"94 after the fashion of his 
91. 268 u.s. 652 (1925). 
92. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
93. Gitlow, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting). 
94. While Holmes could not have paraphrased the famous final line of a movie that 
was made t:-v.enty years later (Gone Wit~ the Wind), he did write to Harold Laski: '"[I]f 
my fellow cttlzens want to go to Hell I wdl help them. It's my job." Rogat and O'Fallon, 
36 Stan. L. Rev. at 1383 (cited in note 89) (quoting M. Howe, ed., I Holmes-Laski Leners 
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philosopher's utterance, in his letter to Hand, "Greatest fool of 
all, Thou not to see that man's destiny is to fight."95 Having de-
cided, in Abrams, to protect freedom of speech, Holmes takes 
the position that "the only meaning of free speech" is to allow 
whatever results from the "marketplace of ideas," even if there-
sult is to shut down free government altogether and, with it, all 
markets, in goods and in ideas, and all other freedoms. 
Here, by contrast, is the key portion of Justice Brandeis' 
opinion in Whitney: 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end 
of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; 
and that in its government the deliberative forces should pre-
vail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end 
and a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happi-
ness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed 
that freedom to think as you will and speak as you think are 
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political 
truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would 
be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily ade-
quate protection against the dissemination of noxious doc-
trine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; 
that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should 
be a fundamental principle of the American government. ... 
If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood 
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, 
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. 
Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the 
rule if authority is to be reconciled with freedom. Such, in my 
opinion, is the command of the Constitution. 96 
Brandeis thus provides a defense of freedom of speech from 
the Madisonian perspective of republican government. The ar-
gument that the end of government is to make men free to de-
velop their faculties resembles Spinoza, although Brandeis may 
have been more optimistic than the philosopher was. The refer-
ence to the discovery and spread of political truth is more akin to 
the Enlightenment philosophers of the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries than to Mill or Holmes. Brandeis' emphasis on 
time for discussion to expose falsehoods through more speech 
249 (1953)). 
95. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Learned Hand, June 24, 1918, quoted in 
Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: 
Some Fragments of History, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 71 (}, 757 (1975). 
96. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis and Holmes, 11., concurring). 
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reflects an essential feature of liberal democratic government, 
reliance on consent of the governed. 
After two major Communist party cases and another crimi-
nal syndicalism case, the Supreme Court finally adopted the 
speech-protective position of Holmes and Brandeis. In the sec-
ond Communist party case, Yates v. United States,91 decided in 
1957, Justice Harlan's majority opinion distinguished between 
"advocacy of forcible overthrow as an abstract doctrine and ad-
vocacy of action to that end."98 Now, the Marxist doctrine of 
violent revolution was termed "abstract advocacy," in contrast to 
some overt step in preparation for the revolution, such as offer-
ing courses in sabotage and street fighting. 99 The Court thus held 
that something more than mere party membership was required 
in order to satisfy the advocacy of action requirement. While 
some of the defendants' cases were remanded, they were dis-
missed by the trial judge and after Yates no new prosecutions 
were instituted.100 Then, in 1969, the Supreme Court overturned 
convictions a§ainst the Ku Klux Klan under Ohio's criminal syn-
dicalism act.1 That act, like the one upheld in Whitney, punished 
the advocacy of the duty or propriety of violence or terrorism. 
Members of the Klan held a rally and made vulgar threats to 
blacks and Jews. The Court overturned the law, reversed Whit-
ney, and presented the following test: 
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press 
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the 
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and 
is likely to incite or produce such action. 102 
This "incitement test" is the current constitutional standard 
for sedition, or subversive speech. It has been described as com-
bining the best of Hand and Holmes, in so far as it uses the ob-
jective requirement of "incitement" and the probabilistic lan-
guage of clear and present danger; it also reflects the 
contributions of Brandeis and Harlan.103 While it may be too 
speech-protective in cases involving militia preparing for violent 
97. 354 u.s. 298 (1957). 
98. ld. at 320. 
99. Id. at 331-32. 
100. Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 123-24 (Random 
House, 1970). 
101. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
102. Id. at 447. 
103. See Gunther, 27 Stan. L. Rev. at 755 (cited in note 95). 
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action, it properly takes account of the tendency among people 
to "blow off steam" without necessarily meaning everything they 
say.104 This was certainly true with the Communist party, which 
many people in this country joined without intending to become 
revolutionaries. As for the Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazi groups, and 
armed militias, they must be taken seriously especially at the 
point where more than mere "abstract advocacy" is involved. 
The best justification, then, for this speech-protective test has 
nothing to do with a desire to have truth win out in the market-
place. Rather, it is part of democratic freedom to allow a certain 
amount of loose talk. To try to stop it, on the grounds that the 
object of even such abstract advocacy is beyond the principles of 
liberal democracy, is likely to have a chilling effect on freedom 
and to anger well-meaning people. This turns out to be the best 
argument for the flag burning decisions of 1989 and 1990 as 
well.105 
IV. CONCLUSION 
What does this complicated inquiry into the philosophic 
grounds of our first amendment freedoms teach us? First, the 
argument for freedom of speech and religious freedom took the 
form of an argument for toleration. That argument contained a 
claim about the power of truth to get itself accepted which, while 
elusive in Milton, who may have meant Christian providence, 
was used rhetorically by Locke in the service of both civil peace 
and the philosophic quest for truth. Spinoza's argument for 
democratic freedom reflects the same twin objectives, and his 
account of the conjunction of rational development and freedom 
is itself rhetorical. Spinoza knew, and made clear to careful 
readers, that full rational development meant the life of philo-
sophic contemplation; such a life was possible for a few people 
only, and hence transcended politics. Political freedom does 
support and encourage rational development on the part of the 
people in so far as it encoura~es activity which addresses the 
hopes and fears of most people. 06 At the same time, such a form 
of government would not persecute philosophers. 
104. Such an approach may be criticized for not taking seriously what people say, 
even when they should be taken seriously; tolerance for "loose talk" may invite provoca-
tive action. But political speech is inherently spirited and liberal democracies are well 
advised to follow Spinoza 's argument and some leeway for speech, and even for associa-
tion. 
105. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 
(1990). 
106. See note 57. 
1998) FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS 353 
Mill espoused a confidence in truth's winning out in the 
marketplace that seems to be based on secular faith in progress, 
a faint reflection of Christian faith in providence. When that po-
sition is taken to the limit of its logic, we get Holmes' Gitlow 
opinion, a thinly disguised confession of nihilism. But the 
thought of Locke and Spinoza, and of Madison, Hand, and 
Brandeis provide us with an alternative understanding and de-
fense of freedom of speech. That approach does not conflate the 
quest for truth into politics by means of some idea of historical 
development. To be able to enjoy the benefits of freedom, we 
would do well to keep in mind the distinction between politics, 
which can secure peace and comfort, and philosophy, which en-
gages the mind in an activity that transcends politics even as it 
ennobles it. 
I will close with a short story. A few years ago when I 
taught Mill's On Liberty to a group of bright students at Middle-
bury, I encountered substantial resistance from most of the class 
when I offered my criticism of his argument. Then two weeks 
later as I entered the class a few minutes early, I overheard sev-
eral of my students engaged in a heated discussion of an opinion 
piece that one of their number, a very bright student with ar-
ticulate conservative opinions, had written in the student news-
paper. Following the argument from Thomas Aquinas on the 
natural ends of human life/07 this student had argued that homo-
sexuality was unnatural and hence while it might be tolerated it 
should be publicly disapproved. The students not only disagreed 
with the argument, but they were livid that the student had writ-
ten the essay for publication in his column and that the newspa-
per had published it. This was a pedagogic moment sent from 
Heaven, if you will permit a Lockean use of the term. I put aside 
my prepared work on some freedom of speech cases to discuss 
the difference between the merits of the argument and the pro-
priety of publication. And I could not resist reminding my very 
bright Millians that they had apparently undergone a transfor-
mation of opinion regarding the status of freedom of speech and 
press, since now that they were confronted with something that 
mattered to them, sexual freedom, they were up in arms that 
anyone would dare to make an argument against its full recogni-
tion. What made it worse for them, better for my pedagogic 
purpose, was that the argument they opposed was cogently pre-
107. "Whether the natural law contains several precepts or only one," St. Thomas 
Aqumas, Summa Theologica, in Anton C. Pegis, ed., Introduction to Saint Thomas Aqui-
nas 634,635-38 (Modern Library, 1948). 
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sented and not clearly wrong, to say the least. The Millian inter-
est in autonomy was at war with the Millian interest in freedom 
to develop an argument. The students gradually carne to under-
stand either that they had accepted Mill's argument on freedom 
of speech too quickly or that they needed to restrain their spirit-
edness. Perhaps each was true. 
